{ }
Resource profile / Redis ACL and Network Security
About this skill

Workflow & requirements

BB Skills evidence and version boundaries (2026-10-04)

This package includes the original official Redis skill and all of its relative references. Original instruction bytes are retained under upstream-original; BB Skills scope notes are identified here. No upstream script is executed automatically on download or installation.

Our disposable Redis 7.4.11 / Python 3.13.16 experiment recorded 44 named observations across the core and security resources together. The source, runner, exact environment and command results are under examples. This is an independent native command fixture, not an AI client's execution of this complete skill; runtime_tested remains false. There are no live-site, TLS, Redis Cluster, persistence, replication, JSON, Vector Set, Java or redis-py checks. Field-level expiry and newer data types require their own server-version and module review.

Use an authorized target and review commands before acting. Core writes can replace values and expiry policies; ACL changes can affect other clients. A plain SET removed existing key expiry in our fixture, while KEEPTTL and hash-field changes retained a positive TTL. WATCH detected one controlled conflicting write. Key naming conventions alone do not enforce tenant isolation.

The source's read-only ACL example includes SCAN: in our fixture it revealed a synthetic key name outside the allowed cache prefix even though GET and mixed-prefix MGET were denied. ACL SETUSER updates are additive; explicitly reset the intended key and command grants when tightening an existing role and verify the response. User off prevented new authentication but an existing connection continued reading until an authorized CLIENT KILL USER. These are observed command semantics, not a claim of a Redis vulnerability or complete production hardening.

The upstream production TLS and network references remain guidance to review separately. The runner uses an internal Docker network with no published ports or production mounts and generated in-memory passwords; its container bind is not a recommended production deployment. No paid service, model call or external account was used. MIT covers included skill sources and identified BB Skills additions; runtime server licenses are separate and no server binary is bundled.

Redis Security

Production hardening for Redis: authentication, ACL-based access control, and network exposure. Cover all three together — any one of them on its own leaves an exploitable gap.

When to apply

  • Deploying or reviewing a Redis instance destined for production.
  • Setting up application credentials beyond a shared password.
  • Auditing a Redis deployment against a security checklist.
  • Receiving "Redis exposed to the internet" findings from a scanner.

1. Always authenticate (and use TLS)

Never run a production Redis without a password. Pair authentication with TLS so credentials and data aren't sent in clear text.

# redis.conf
requirepass your-strong-password
tls-port 6380
tls-cert-file /path/to/redis.crt
tls-key-file  /path/to/redis.key
r = redis.Redis(
    host="localhost",
    port=6380,
    password="your-strong-password",
    ssl=True,
    ssl_cert_reqs="required",
)

If you can use ACL users (next section) instead of the single requirepass, do — requirepass is effectively the legacy "default user" shortcut.

See references/auth.md.

2. ACLs for least-privilege access

The default user with a shared password is fine for development. For production, give each application a dedicated ACL user with only the commands and key patterns it actually needs.

# Cache-only reader
ACL SETUSER app_readonly on >password ~cache:* +get +mget +scan

# Writer that can't run dangerous ops
ACL SETUSER app_writer   on >password ~*        +@all -@dangerous

# Admin (use sparingly, never for application traffic)
ACL SETUSER admin        on >strong-password ~* +@all

Useful command categories:

Category What it covers
@read Read commands (GET, MGET, HGET, ...)
@write Write commands (SET, DEL, XADD, ...)
@dangerous FLUSHALL, DEBUG, KEYS, etc.
@admin Administrative commands

If app credentials leak, a tight ACL bounds the blast radius — the attacker can't FLUSHALL your DB just because they grabbed a cache reader's password.

See references/acls.md.

3. Restrict network access

The most common Redis breach is a public-internet Redis with no auth. Avoid that with three layers:

# redis.conf — bind to specific interfaces, keep protected-mode on
bind 127.0.0.1 192.168.1.100
protected-mode yes
# Firewall — allow only application subnets
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 6379 -s 192.168.1.0/24 -j ACCEPT
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 6379 -j DROP

Anti-pattern: bind 0.0.0.0 + protected-mode no — exposes Redis to the whole network without protection.

Optional but recommended: rename or disable destructive commands so a compromised client can't trash the DB:

rename-command FLUSHALL ""
rename-command DEBUG ""
rename-command CONFIG ""

See references/network.md.

References

PACKAGE TRANSPARENCY

Inspect before installing

Source: Redis, Inc. · MIT · SHA-256 shown alongside the download.

14 files20033 ZIP bytes2 script/code files

License file included. A license and checksum are not a security certification. Review package instructions and scripts before running them.

View files and uncompressed sizes
Machine-readable installation guide →
CATALOG REVIEW NOTES

Know what you need before installing

Source and packaging checks recorded on 2026-10-04. These notes are not safety certification or measured task performance.

Requirements

Review target Redis version, required data types/modules, TLS and application credentials. Source package requires no account. Included fixture needs Python 3, Docker and separately reviewed runtime images; it uses RESP2 with synthetic data. See examples/README.md for reproducing outside the original lab image.

Costs, access & practical limits

Free MIT source package and free synthetic command experiment; no paid API or cloud account used. Not a full AI skill, TLS, production, load/performance, Redis Cluster or persistence evaluation. Scope notes explain ACL names, additive updates and existing connections. Runtime binaries/licenses are separate.

View the recorded checks
  • Included upstream originals match pinned Git blob and SHA-256
  • Every relative reference resolves within the package
  • MIT notices and exact modification attribution retained
  • Synthetic native command observations bound to exact fixture sources and image identities
  • No AI-client execution, TLS, production hardening or performance certification claimed

Upstream commit: a84871d065f398fed55e1633f66b66f731eb4e2b

Runtime status: not tested by this catalog. Configure your client and test the skill in your own environment.

LICENSE & ATTRIBUTION

Different files carry different terms

This bundle preserves more than one upstream license. The labels do not mean that every file is offered under either license at your choice. Read the original notices before adapting or redistributing it.

MIT ↗

Redis official skill instructions, complete references and source context

Attribution: Copyright (c) 2026 Redis, Inc.

Changes: Primary instruction preface added; unchanged original retained and references unmodified

Included notice: redis-security/LICENSE.upstream.txt

Declared source ↗

MIT ↗

BB Skills fixture, scope preface and evidence

Attribution: Copyright (c) 2026 BB Skills

Changes: Independent synthetic command fixture and explicit bounded observations added

Included notice: redis-security/LICENSE.bb-skills.txt

Declared source ↗

For the CC BY-SA material, retain attribution and license links, indicate changes, and apply the required ShareAlike terms to adaptations. These notices do not imply endorsement by the original creators.

SCENARIOS

Inputs, criteria and recorded outcomes

Records are supplied by the site administrator and bound to a specific package. They are not third-party safety certification. This page does not execute skills.

Native Redis ACL key visibility, additive rules and revocation

Reported passed · va84871d065f3.bb1

View input and acceptance criteria

Input

Synthetic cache-reader ACL, denied value/write/destructive commands, key-name discovery through SCAN, additive updates, deliberate permission reset, new-auth denial and one existing connection termination. Shared fixture has 44 observations; this record covers the ACL/authentication subset only. No TLS or production hardening test.

Acceptance criteria

Recorded native responses agree with the named synthetic command contracts. Explicit denied operations, aborted transaction and connection termination are expected results. These are documented command boundaries rather than a security certification or full skill evaluation.

Recorded outcome

Synthetic cache-reader ACL, denied value/write/destructive commands, key-name discovery through SCAN, additive updates, deliberate permission reset, new-auth denial and one existing connection termination. Shared fixture has 44 observations; this record covers the ACL/authentication subset only. No TLS or production hardening test.

{
  "format": 1,
  "executed_at": "2026-10-04T11:30:47.481468+00:00",
  "redis_version": "7.4.11",
  "python": "3.13.16",
  "observations": 44,
  "cases": [
    {
      "name": "initial-default-authentication",
      "observed": "OK",
      "expected": "OK",
      "status": "passed"
    },
    {
      "name": "initial-isolated-default-ping",
      "observed": "PONG",
      "expected": "PONG",
      "status": "passed"
    },
    {
      "name": "string-counter-increments",
      "observed": 1,
      "expected": 1,
      "status": "passed"
    },
    {
      "name": "string-counter-second-increment",
      "observed": 2,
      "expected": 2,
      "status": "passed"
    },
    {
      "name": "hash-add-two-fields",
      "observed": 2,
      "expected": 2,
      "status": "passed"
    },
    {
      "name": "hash-update-existing-field",
      "observed": 0,
      "expected": 0,
      "status": "passed"
    },
    {
      "name": "hash-other-field-preserved",
      "observed": "Sample",
      "expected": "Sample",
      "status": "passed"
    },
    {
      "name": "set-deduplicates",
      "observed": 2,
      "expected": 2,
      "status": "passed"
    },
    {
      "name": "set-membership",
      "observed": 1,
      "expected": 1,
      "status": "passed"
    },
    {
      "name": "sorted-set-score-order",
      "observed": 2,
      "expected": 2,
      "status": "passed"
    },
    {
      "name": "sorted-set-reversed-ranking",
      "observed": [
        "b",
        "a"
      ],
      "expected": [
        "b",
        "a"
      ],
      "status": "passed"
    },
    {
      "name": "ttl-created-with-set-ex",
      "observed": "OK",
      "expected": "OK",
      "status": "passed"
    },
    {
      "name": "ttl-in-positive-window",
      "observed": true,
      "expected": true,
      "status": "passed"
    },
    {
      "name": "plain-set-replaces-value",
      "observed": "OK",
      "expected": "OK",
      "status": "passed"
    },
    {
      "name": "plain-set-removes-existing-ttl",
      "observed": -1,
      "expected": -1,
      "status": "passed"
    },
    {
      "name": "set-keepttl-update",
      "observed": "OK",
      "expected": "OK",
      "status": "passed"
    },
    {
      "name": "keepttl-retains-positive-window",
      "observed": true,
      "expected": true,
      "status": "passed"
    },
    {
      "name": "hash-field-write-retains-key-ttl",
      "observed": true,
      "expected": true,
      "status": "passed"
    },
    {
      "name": "missing-key-ttl",
      "observed": -2,
      "expected": -2,
      "status": "passed"
    },
    {
      "name": "watch-registers",
      "observed": "OK",
      "expected": "OK",
      "status": "passed"
    },
    {
      "name": "watch-exec-aborts-after-intervening-write",
      "observed": null,
      "expected": null,
      "status": "passed"
    },
    {
      "name": "aborted-transaction-did-not-write",
      "observed": "1",
      "expected": "1",
      "status": "passed"
    },
    {
      "name": "multi-exec-success",
      "observed": [
        2,
        "2"
      ],
      "expected": [
        2,
        "2"
      ],
      "status": "passed"
    },
    {
      "name": "dedicated-admin-authentication",
      "observed": "OK",
      "expected": "OK",
      "status": "passed"
    },
    {
      "name": "anonymous-command-after-default-disabled",
      "observed": {
        "error": "NOAUTH"
      },
      "expected": {
        "error": "NOAUTH"
      },
      "status": "passed"
    },
    {
      "name": "reader-authentication",
      "observed": "OK",
      "expected": "OK",
      "status": "passed"
    },
    {
      "name": "reader-get-allowed-prefix",
      "observed": "synthetic-cache",
      "expected": "synthetic-cache",
      "status": "passed"
    },
    {
      "name": "reader-get-denied-other-prefix",
      "observed": {
        "error": "NOPERM"
      },
      "expected": {
        "error": "NOPERM"
      },
      "status": "passed"
    },
    {
      "name": "reader-write-denied",
      "observed": {
        "error": "NOPERM"
      },
      "expected": {
        "error": "NOPERM"
      },
      "status": "passed"
    },
    {
      "name": "reader-flushall-denied",
      "observed": {
        "error": "NOPERM"
      },
      "expected": {
        "error": "NOPERM"
      },
      "status": "passed"
    },
    {
      "name": "reader-mixed-prefix-mget-denied",
      "observed": {
        "error": "NOPERM"
      },
      "expected": {
        "error": "NOPERM"
      },
      "status": "passed"
    },
    {
      "name": "denied-write-left-value-unchanged",
      "observed": "synthetic-cache",
      "expected": "synthetic-cache",
      "status": "passed"
    },
    {
      "name": "scan-can-reveal-key-name-outside-acl-prefix",
      "observed": true,
      "expected": true,
      "status": "passed"
    },
    {
      "name": "additive-acl-update-retains-private-prefix",
      "observed": "synthetic-private",
      "expected": "synthetic-private",
      "status": "passed"
    },
    {
      "name": "additive-acl-update-retains-write-command",
      "observed": "OK",
      "expected": "OK",
      "status": "passed"
    },
    {
      "name": "acl-tighten-key-and-command-rules",
      "observed": "OK",
      "expected": "OK",
      "status": "passed"
    },
    {
      "name": "resetkeys-removes-private-prefix",
      "observed": {
        "error": "NOPERM"
      },
      "expected": {
        "error": "NOPERM"
      },
      "status": "passed"
    },
    {
      "name": "command-reset-removes-write",
      "observed": {
        "error": "NOPERM"
      },
      "expected": {
        "error": "NOPERM"
      },
      "status": "passed"
    },
    {
      "name": "command-reset-removes-scan",
      "observed": {
        "error": "NOPERM"
      },
      "expected": {
        "error": "NOPERM"
      },
      "status": "passed"
    },
    {
      "name": "off-prevents-new-user-authentication",
      "observed": {
        "error": "WRONGPASS"
      },
      "expected": {
        "error": "WRONGPASS"
      },
      "status": "passed"
    },
    {
      "name": "off-existing-authenticated-connection-still-reads",
      "observed": "changed",
      "expected": "changed",
      "status": "passed"
    },
    {
      "name": "kill-user-closes-one-existing-connection",
      "observed": 1,
      "expected": 1,
      "status": "passed"
    },
    {
      "name": "killed-user-connection-closed",
      "observed": true,
      "expected": true,
      "status": "passed"
    },
    {
      "name": "private-data-remains-after-denied-destructive-command",
      "observed": "synthetic-private",
      "expected": "synthetic-private",
      "status": "passed"
    }
  ],
  "runtime_tested": false,
  "native_command_fixture_tested": true,
  "tls_tested": false,
  "production_tested": false,
  "ai_client_executed": false,
  "synthetic_credentials_retained": false,
  "source_hashes": {
    "probe-redis.py": "661f1ba5cc70b97bc01b7a0c93112feb25b404ac57356d7423a48f9438dcfe08",
    "run-redis-fixture.py": "0da5619bea2435069f92d6a0df36211e79e113de68adf487571462be1c1b814e"
  },
  "images": {
    "redis:7-alpine": {
      "id": "sha256:858f009f9709ce576febc734aa78b8f6d624b82571f9ddb6bda4377c833b3499",
      "digests": [
        "redis@sha256:858f009f9709ce576febc734aa78b8f6d624b82571f9ddb6bda4377c833b3499"
      ]
    },
    "bb-skills:20261004-v41": {
      "id": "sha256:58a204606eb5975702ea621384c6f92a5697aa4cd9252bc3fa22db800f6cab78",
      "digests": [
        "bb-skills@sha256:58a204606eb5975702ea621384c6f92a5697aa4cd9252bc3fa22db800f6cab78"
      ]
    }
  },
  "fixture": {
    "internal_network": true,
    "published_ports": false,
    "production_mounts": false,
    "persistent_data": false,
    "synthetic_only": true,
    "network_bind_note": "Container-only 0.0.0.0 within a dedicated internal Docker network; not a production network configuration."
  }
}

Environment

Disposable internal Docker network, no published ports or production mounts, tmpfs data. Redis 7.4.11; Python 3.13.16. Synthetic credentials and values only. No AI client, TLS, production, persistence, replication or Redis Cluster.

Package SHA-256: 57c1f3e30f28a4df9386e424b622129c37c6951c8b7856802399d5440253b1f2

Outcome recorded: 2026-10-04 11:30 UTC

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