redis-security/SKILL.md

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name: redis-security description: Redis security guidance covering authentication (requirepass and ACL users), TLS, ACL-based least-privilege access control, restricting network exposure via bind and protected-mode, firewall rules, and disabling dangerous commands. Use when deploying Redis to production, defining ACL users for an application, configuring TLS connections, locking down a Redis instance behind a firewall, or auditing a Redis deployment for security hardening. license: MIT metadata: author: Redis, Inc. version: "0.1.0"

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BB Skills evidence and version boundaries (2026-10-04)

This package includes the original official Redis skill and all of its relative references. Original instruction bytes are retained under upstream-original; BB Skills scope notes are identified here. No upstream script is executed automatically on download or installation.

Our disposable Redis 7.4.11 / Python 3.13.16 experiment recorded 44 named observations across the core and security resources together. The source, runner, exact environment and command results are under examples. This is an independent native command fixture, not an AI client's execution of this complete skill; runtime_tested remains false. There are no live-site, TLS, Redis Cluster, persistence, replication, JSON, Vector Set, Java or redis-py checks. Field-level expiry and newer data types require their own server-version and module review.

Use an authorized target and review commands before acting. Core writes can replace values and expiry policies; ACL changes can affect other clients. A plain SET removed existing key expiry in our fixture, while KEEPTTL and hash-field changes retained a positive TTL. WATCH detected one controlled conflicting write. Key naming conventions alone do not enforce tenant isolation.

The source's read-only ACL example includes SCAN: in our fixture it revealed a synthetic key name outside the allowed cache prefix even though GET and mixed-prefix MGET were denied. ACL SETUSER updates are additive; explicitly reset the intended key and command grants when tightening an existing role and verify the response. User off prevented new authentication but an existing connection continued reading until an authorized CLIENT KILL USER. These are observed command semantics, not a claim of a Redis vulnerability or complete production hardening.

The upstream production TLS and network references remain guidance to review separately. The runner uses an internal Docker network with no published ports or production mounts and generated in-memory passwords; its container bind is not a recommended production deployment. No paid service, model call or external account was used. MIT covers included skill sources and identified BB Skills additions; runtime server licenses are separate and no server binary is bundled.

Redis Security

Production hardening for Redis: authentication, ACL-based access control, and network exposure. Cover all three together — any one of them on its own leaves an exploitable gap.

When to apply

• Deploying or reviewing a Redis instance destined for production.
• Setting up application credentials beyond a shared password.
• Auditing a Redis deployment against a security checklist.
• Receiving "Redis exposed to the internet" findings from a scanner.

1. Always authenticate (and use TLS)

Never run a production Redis without a password. Pair authentication with TLS so credentials and data aren't sent in clear text.

# redis.conf
requirepass your-strong-password
tls-port 6380
tls-cert-file /path/to/redis.crt
tls-key-file  /path/to/redis.key

r = redis.Redis(
    host="localhost",
    port=6380,
    password="your-strong-password",
    ssl=True,
    ssl_cert_reqs="required",
)

If you can use ACL users (next section) instead of the single requirepass, do — requirepass is effectively the legacy "default user" shortcut.

See references/auth.md.

2. ACLs for least-privilege access

The default user with a shared password is fine for development. For production, give each application a dedicated ACL user with only the commands and key patterns it actually needs.

# Cache-only reader
ACL SETUSER app_readonly on >password ~cache:* +get +mget +scan

# Writer that can't run dangerous ops
ACL SETUSER app_writer   on >password ~*        +@all -@dangerous

# Admin (use sparingly, never for application traffic)
ACL SETUSER admin        on >strong-password ~* +@all

Useful command categories:

Category	What it covers
@read	Read commands (GET, MGET, HGET, ...)
@write	Write commands (SET, DEL, XADD, ...)
@dangerous	FLUSHALL, DEBUG, KEYS, etc.
@admin	Administrative commands

If app credentials leak, a tight ACL bounds the blast radius — the attacker can't FLUSHALL your DB just because they grabbed a cache reader's password.

See references/acls.md.

3. Restrict network access

The most common Redis breach is a public-internet Redis with no auth. Avoid that with three layers:

# redis.conf — bind to specific interfaces, keep protected-mode on
bind 127.0.0.1 192.168.1.100
protected-mode yes

# Firewall — allow only application subnets
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 6379 -s 192.168.1.0/24 -j ACCEPT
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 6379 -j DROP

Anti-pattern: bind 0.0.0.0 + protected-mode no — exposes Redis to the whole network without protection.

Optional but recommended: rename or disable destructive commands so a compromised client can't trash the DB:

rename-command FLUSHALL ""
rename-command DEBUG ""
rename-command CONFIG ""

See references/network.md.

References

• Redis: Security
• Redis: ACL